Officials with the National Transportation Safety Board blamed “systemic failures” for the deadly helicopter and airliner collision over Washington, D.C. in 2025.
NTSB officials blamed the Federal Aviation Administration, the Army, a lack of technology, and overloaded air traffic control for the crash, according to a January 28 report.
The collision killed 64 people on the airplane and all three crewmembers on the helicopter, marking America’s deadliest aviation tragedy since November 2001.
In a meeting on January 27, NTSB officials approved 74 findings and 50 recommendations to prevent similar accidents in the future. They called for reforms to helicopter routes, air traffic control, safety systems, data sharing, and “collision avoidance technology.”
“This complex and comprehensive one-year investigation identified serious and long-standing safety gaps in the airspace over our nation’s capital,” said NTSB Chairwoman Jennifer Homendy in a press release. “Sadly, the conditions for this tragedy were in place long before the night of Jan. 29.”
When American Airlines Flight 5342 approached Ronald Reagan National Airport around 8:48 p.m. on January 29, 2025, it nearly reached its destination before exploding into a ball of fire.
As The Dallas Express reported at the time, an Army Blackhawk helicopter collided with the plane over the Potomac River.
Soon after the tragedy, President Donald Trump expressed sorrow for the victims, suggesting discriminatory “diversity, equity, and inclusion” policies could have been to blame.
When NTSB officials announced the findings of their investigation on January 28, they blamed several factors for the crash.
“The FAA’s helicopter route design in the Washington area failed to provide procedural separation between helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft operating on approach and departure paths at Reagan National,” the release reads. “Investigators concluded that the route structure allowed helicopters to fly directly beneath an active approach corridor for commercial airliners.”
Investigators also found “deficiencies in FAA guidance” about helicopter altitudes and boundaries.
“Inconsistent and unclear information” led some pilots to misinterpret some altitudes as being safe from planes, when they were not. Meanwhile, charts for planes did not show nearby helicopter paths intersecting approaches.
NTSB officials said the FAA lacked effective strategies to find, assess, and reduce “recurring” midair collisions above the airport.
“Despite available safety data showing repeated close encounters between helicopters and airplanes near the airport, the FAA did not conduct sufficient safety analysis or take timely corrective action,” the release reads. “The agency also did not act on recommendations from local air traffic control personnel and other helicopter operators who raised concerns about known conflict areas.”
Meanwhile, investigators also found the Army’s processes failed to identify and address helicopter hazards in “congested and complicated” civilian airspace. Specifically, they found the Army lacked a flight data monitoring program for helicopters near major airports and had limited safety reporting systems.
“As a result, routine excursions above the authorized helicopter route altitudes and close proximity incidents that presented a risk of midair collision went unrecognized by Army safety personnel,” the release reads.
They also found that a lack of technology was partially to blame.
Neither aircraft had collision avoidance technology to provide effective alerts at low altitudes. While the airliner’s system worked as intended, altitude limits prevented effective alerts.
NTSB officials found that this could have provided the crew with “real-time maneuvering instructions to avoid the collision” 59 seconds earlier.
Meanwhile, they found air traffic control practices contributed to the crash.
“The NTSB found that the high workload during a period of elevated traffic reduced air traffic control’s ability to monitor developing conflicts and provide timely safety alerts,” the release reads. “Separate radio frequencies for helicopters and airplanes further increased risk, as blocked transmissions prevented critical instructions from being fully received.”
The report also found the pilots were certified and medically qualified for their duties that night, and the plane and helicopter were properly maintained.
Though it found that air traffic controllers could have notified the Army helicopter sooner had they been handling planes and helicopters separately. It also found that the lack of mandatory relief periods for supervisors was contrary to research showing a decline in performance.
As a result, the NTSB issued 33 safety recommendations to the FAA, eight to the Army, and more to the Department of Transportation, Department of War Policy Board on Federal Aviation, and the RTCA.
“Our work doesn’t end with the issuance of a final report; that’s just the first step,” Homendy said in the release. “We will vigorously advocate for the implementation of our safety recommendations – that’s how we prevent a tragedy like this from happening again.”
The family of an airliner passenger sued American Airlines and the operator, PSA Airlines, in September, saying negligence led to the tragedy, as The Dallas Express reported at the time. Plaintiffs specifically blamed the airline for ignoring previous near misses.
