Specialist Flags UT-MD Anderson’s Risky Chinese Partnerships

(Texas Scorecard) – A specialist has identified potential research security risks within the UT-MD Anderson Cancer Center, including a collaboration with the Chinese People’s Liberation Army.

This follows the arrest of one of the institution’s former researchers—a Chinese national—who attempted to steal cancer-related research.

Risky Collaborations

Analysis by the research security firm IPTalons suggests the University of Texas MD Anderson Cancer Center (MD Anderson) has gaps in security measures against foreign influence groups (FIGs), with more than 70 Chinese entities actively targeting the center’s researchers.

The U.S. government has identified communist China as a top national security threat.

“Unfortunately, like other leading research universities in Texas, foreign influence groups (FIGs) have been targeting M.D. Anderson Cancer Center for decades,” Allen Phelps, chief executive officer of IPTalons, wrote.

Phelps stated that analysis of “FIG threat activity” from January 2024 to July 2025 found that more than 70 FIGs have been targeting MD Anderson researchers. Many of these FIGs are Chinese universities.

“When over 70 Chinese entities—many tied directly to military-civil fusion projects—are actively targeting MD Anderson, it is not just an academic concern; it is a matter of state and national security,” State Sen. Bob Hall (R–Edgewood) told Texas Scorecard.

IPTalons found that MD Anderson researchers had collaborated on 287 open-source research publications, also known as unclassified academic research papers, with foreign researchers from “high-risk organizations in China.”

“High-risk organizations are those research institutions in China that are known or suspected of working on military-civilian fusion projects, according to the risk profiles established by the Australian Defence Tracker,” Phelps explained.

Additionally, IPTalons’ list of FIGs includes more than 20 organizations that the U.S. government has either sanctioned or put on export control restrictions. These were confirmed by checking the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) Entity List, and the Department of Defense’s Section 1260H List of Chinese Military Companies.

The list includes the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, University of Science and Technology of China, Center for High Pressure Science & Technology Advanced Research, and Xijing Hospital.

The collaborations are troublesome in and of themselves; the sources of funding elevate concerns for security experts.

“Open source research indicates that Chinese funding sources, including the Higher Education Discipline Innovation Project, the National Natural Science Foundation of China, the Science and Technology Commission of Shanghai, the National Key R&D Program of China, and the Shanghai Rising Star Program, have been either directly or indirectly supporting MDACC researchers,” Phelps wrote.

“Research centers like MD Anderson should treat all CCP-controlled entities as military or intelligence arms of the party-state that has defined America as its ‘chief enemy’ for 35 years,” Michael Lucci, CEO of State Armor, commented. “Ask whether such a partnership is a good idea in light of that reality. Most partnerships should be avoided, and anything with sanctioned entities and explicit military assets [is a] total no-go.”

IPTalons conducted its analysis using its RedBook Foreign Influence Risk Detection and Response platform.

In a statement, State Rep. Terry Wilson (R–Georgetown), who authored Texas’s new research security law—House Bill 127—asserted that the new law is sufficient to counter the Chinese threat.

The Method

In a previous interview, Phelps noted that China targets work in unclassified research, also known as basic fundamental research, in academia because that’s where most of America’s critical security technology originates.

Often, U.S. federal officials do not determine whether academic research should be classified until it’s further along in development. That is when there is a clearer picture of the practical application of the research. By that time, foreign adversaries, such as China, have already gotten their hooks into it.

The CCP will also target medical research, for example, cancer. If its operatives co-develop a cure, they could dispute the intellectual property rights and potentially hold America hostage.

They also twist medical research for other purposes. “China and other foreign threat actors exploit research in fields such as genetics, medicine, AI/ML, and more to suppress vulnerable populations and target individuals,” an August 2025 report from the National Counterintelligence and Security Center stated.

Lucci commented that “China’s strategy to defeat the United States is built upon turning our own strengths against us by sapping the ingenuity of our open society while corrupting our institutions.”

On August 25, the Harris County District Attorney’s Office filed charges against 35-year-old Yunhai Li for attempting to steal proprietary cancer-related research from MD Anderson Cancer Center and take it back to China. Li, in the U.S. on a research scholar visa, had been previously employed at the center as a researcher.

A national effort has been coalescing to block the China threat.

Raise Shields

On July 8, 2025, the U.S. Department of Justice announced the arrest of Xu Zewei on allegations of “hacking and stealing crucial COVID-19 research at the behest of the Chinese government while that same government was simultaneously withholding information about the virus and its origins.”

In January 2021, before the inauguration of President Joe Biden, the first Trump Administration issued National Security Presidential Memorandum–33 (NSPM-33), which mandates research security programs at institutions receiving over $50 million in federal funds protect U.S. research from foreign interference.

In August 2023, the U.S. Department of Commerce issued National Institute of Standards and Technology Internal Report 8484 (NISTIR 8484). The report provides a cybersecurity framework to safeguard research data, supporting NSPM-33’s goals.

In July 2025, the U.S. Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party sent letters to seven American universities—none of them in Texas—to end their joint programs with the Chinese Scholarship Council.

“The CCP has a long track record of acquiring U.S. technology through both legal and illegal tactics—including talent recruitment programs, academic partnerships that serve its military, forced tech transfer, espionage, and outright theft,” the committee stated. “Shuttering joint programs like these has been a long-term objective of the committee.”

Texas lawmakers have noticed the China threat as well. A December 2024 Texas House committee report recognized the need for stricter security measures. During the 2025 legislative session, lawmakers acted, passing multiple measures, including a new research security law—House Bill 127.

“Texas’ new research security law comes not a moment too soon,” Lucci stated. “We need the strong vetting of research partnerships and stronger penalties for trade secret theft provided by HB 127, which was championed by Senator Hughes and Representative Terry Wilson.”

The law also creates a Texas Higher Education Research Security Council to supervise the protection of university systems.

But Phelps has cautioned that universities are still taking “an academic approach” to research security, writing papers but not taking preventive measures. “Research security is not an academic exercise,” he said.

Hall acknowledged that the legislature and Gov. Greg Abbott had taken “significant steps” to better shield Texas from Chinese infiltration.

“This latest report, however, makes clear that more work is needed to safeguard Texas research institutions from foreign influence and exploitation,” he stated. “My office will engage with leadership at Texas institutions to diagnose the scope of this threat and envision solutions that combat information and resource exploitation by foreign adversaries.”

UT-MD Anderson Cancer Center provided the following statement:

The University of Texas System did not respond to a request for comment before publication.