American universities, including Texas A&M, are not fully shielded from Chinese government infiltration.
Records show the Aggie institution has allowed China to infiltrate its Engineering Experiment Station, which works on multiple high-profile projects, including those dealing with national security. These same records show China isn’t the only threat university leadership has allowed inside.
Communist China has been infiltrating American universities for years. In November 2018, the Trump administration considered stronger checks on Chinese students coming to the United States after a July 2018 allegation that a Chinese citizen stole “invisibility cloak” technology from Duke University. However, this was not an isolated incident.
A May 2021 report from the National Association of Scholars (NAS) documented 47 China-connected incidents at American institutions, including higher education. The list included institutions like the University of California, Harvard, and—notably—Texas A&M (TAMU).
In August 2020, Zhengdong Cheng, a NASA researcher at TAMU, was arrested for “False Statements and Wire Fraud” in connection with a CCP program. Cheng allegedly “took steps to obscure his affiliations and collaboration with a Chinese University and at least one Chinese-owned company.” Since then, Texas A&M is still not fully secured.
Red Threat
TAMU records show, as far back as Fiscal Year 2015, leadership allowed visiting scholars from China into the Texas A&M Engineering Experiment Station (TEES). This part of TAMU works on U.S. national security projects like cybersecurity, hypersonic development, and the George H.W. Bush Combat Development Complex.
Texas Scorecard obtained this record through a Texas Public Information Act request. We have redacted the names of the scholars. The citizenship of the scholars, home university or employer, and TEES department they studied or worked in remain.
In FY 2016, TAMU allowed 87 Chinese citizens into the Texas A&M Engineering Experiment Station (TEES). Of the 87, 52 came from universities that the Australian Strategic Policy Institute found had low to high-security risks. Of those, three came from the Harbin Institute of Technology, two from the Harbin Engineering University, and two from the Beijing Institute of Technology. All three are very high-risk defense labs and members of China’s “Seven Sons of National Defence.”
In FY 2021, the number of visiting Chinese scholars allowed into TEES collapsed to two. However, TAMU leadership has steadily increased the number since then. They allowed four in FY 22 and ten in FY 2023.
The records prove problematic for Texas A&M, which is a U.S. defense contractor. China, under the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), has been established as a threat to America by the Office of the U.S. Director of National Intelligence (DNI).
“The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) will attempt to preempt challenges to its reputation and legitimacy, undercutting U.S. influence, driving wedges between Washington and its partners, and fostering global norms that favor its authoritarian system,” the DNI’s February 2024 Annual Threat Assessment read. “The PRC combines its economic heft with its growing military power and its diplomatic and technological dominance for a coordinated approach to strengthen CCP rule, secure what it views as its sovereign territory and regional preeminence, and pursue global power.”
Kyle Bass, a member of the Committee on the Present Danger: China, told Texas Scorecard that the incongruency between the DNI’s official position and how Texas A&M has handled visiting scholars is troubling.
“Why is our intelligence director, who’s in charge of all of our intelligence agencies, telling Congress that the largest threat to U.S. national security is China, and yet, Texas A&M University is happily taking advanced engineering students from China and plugging them into some of our most sensitive projects? It makes no sense.” He also said the decrease in the number of scholars from 2016 to 2023 doesn’t matter. “My view on this is you either have cancer or you don’t have cancer,” explained Bass. “Even if you can’t prove the ‘visiting scholar’ is a CCP agent, if their parents and grandparents and siblings live in China, the CCP can pressure you to deliver any information that they ask for.”
Bass referenced a Chinese law passed in 2017, and slightly amended in 2018, that mandated Chinese citizens abroad to engage in espionage for the government.
TAMU tolerating these incursions violates the Aggie Code of Honor: “An Aggie does not lie, cheat or steal or tolerate those who do.”
Bass further warned about CCP-connected nations. For example, TAMU allowed one scholar from the United Arab Emirates in FY 2023. “The UAE has a deep, deep technological partnership with China. The UAE has an extradition treaty with China and does not have an extradition treaty with the United States,” said Bass. “It is a sunny place for shady people.”
Not Just China
Records showed TAMU leadership has allowed more threats than just China inside TEES. The 2024 DNI report identified the Islamist nation of Iran as hostile. Yet in FY 2022 and 2023, TAMU welcomed at least one Iranian scholar into TEES. TAMU also allowed into TEES six Egyptian scholars and four from Pakistan in FY 2023. Kyle Bass called attention to this. “Egypt is a problem country,” he said. “Pakistan is 100 percent a problem country.”
The home institution listed for a number of the Egyptian and Pakistani scholars was Texas A&M’s Qatar Campus. On February 8, Texas A&M University System’s Board of Regents voted 7-1 to start a four-year process to close that campus. This was after a 2024 report accused A&M of allowing Qatar full ownership of “more than 500” “highly sensitive” research projects.
It is curious why TAMU leadership allows scholars from hostile nations inside, when there are friendly nations to choose from. “My view, let’s bring in as many Indians as we can. Let’s bring in democracy students,” Bass said.
Threat Response
With American national security on the line, higher education institutions must protect themselves from hostile nations. There is no room for deviations. “You either have cancer, or you don’t have cancer. You can’t just have a little bit of cancer,” Bass said.
“Unfortunately, the difficult decision that needs to be made is to disallow these partnerships with countries,” he continued, adding that foreign nationals must be run through national security clearance by the federal government.
It is concerning that Texas A&M, which is not only a U.S. defense contractor but is also supposed to be a conservative institution that stands out from the rest, is not leading in this area. Bass said TAMU needs to be asked how it plans to abide by federal law regarding protecting its intellectual property. “What are their plans to do so, and how do they screen?” he asked. “They need to explain to us exactly how they screen against our foreign foes.”
Since 2023, national security questions have buffeted TAMU, centering on its ties to the CCP and its Qatar Campus. To this day, it is unknown how far these entities have penetrated TAMU.
In a December 2023 investigative report of CCP infiltration into TAMU, the university stated they had conducted a “thorough review” in 2021 and “terminated all high-risk engagements.” Texas Scorecard sent a request to obtain this system review. In February 2024, TAMU leadership chose to hide this review. They appealed our request to the Texas Attorney General’s Office. In April, the AG’s office agreed that TAMU could withhold the requested records.
Texas Scorecard asked Texas A&M and the Texas A&M University System for comment. No response was received before publication.